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Preface

Before I present this copy of my project,

I would like to

take a moment to talk about how the nature of the project changed
from its inception to its completion.
to

Originally I had planned

disassemble the Pakistani Virus and write a program to attack

it.

A bold venture to be sure but one I thought was within
At the urging of my advisor, Dr. Phillips,

reach.

I altered the

description to make it at least partially a survey of computer
viruses,

as reported in the media and other sources.

I also

decided to add the part about a small case study of the attack at

SIU.
As it turns out, experience again saved the day.

I ran into

numerous difficulties trying to take apart the virus, much less
writing a program to counter it.

With the lack of time and

resources, degree of difficulty

the Pakistani virus is reputed

to be the most technically sophisticated virus in the world), and
the normal rigors of a college semester, the task proved too
much.

So I fell back onto the survey part of my project.

There were also problems in this.
available to me were rather limited.

The resources that were
I had trouble obtaining the

more comprehensive and technical reports concerning viruses,

through the inter-library loan system.

I decided near the

even

project's completion to keep the non-technical because of
difficulty in obtaining resources, the technical aspects are very
case-specific, and

the readibility for non computer scientists

would have been significantly decreased.
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winner was the program that had destroyed the other program or
controlled the most memory at the end of the allotted time.

Soon

the game caught on at other research facilities and was dubbed
lICore Wars".2

Its creators realized the damage that could be done by their
"organisms"

if they were allowed to run rampant. The actual code

wasn't as troublesome as the theory.

There was the fear that

someone with malicious intent could loose a program and cause
untold destruction of data.

In reality the threat was small

because a machine with code gone wild could easily shut down.

At

the time most machines stood alone but as connectivity and
computer access grew, so did the danger.

For the most part, Core

Wars and the idea of battling destructive code was kept quiet •
• until 1983.
At an Association for Computing Machinery banquet, Ken
Thompson, creator of the original version of UNIX, was being
given an award.
create organisms.

In his speech, he told of core wars and how to
"If you have never done this,

try it on your own. "'"

In 1984,

I urge you. to

"Scientific American" followed

with an article on Core Wars and offered guidelines for creating
your own battlefields and organisms.
paper,

Fred Cohen presented a

Viruses: Theory and Experiments, to a computer security

conference in 1984.-

Soon after the name, computer virus, caught

on and so did the practice of creating and releasing them.
Occasionally stories of viral epidemics appeared in the press
but for the most part the public was unaware of what could

happen.

In 1986 sporadic stories about viruses and their

potential danger were printed but they were ignored or dismissed
even by many professional in the field.

On Wednesday, November

2, 1988 the outbreak that many had feared and some even predicted
occurred.
At about 6pm Wednesday the infectious code (technically it
was a worm) was first noticed at several computer centers
connected by Internet and began attracting a great deal of
attention a few hours

later.~

The worm was

reproducing so

rapidly, it slowed down what ever system it infected.

Because of

its crippling effects and sophistication many talented computer
scientists were worried but intrigued by the worm.

People all

along Internet, which is connected to several premiere research
networks such as BAR and ARPAnet, began to dissect the worm and
work on a fix.·

Graduate students, researchers and system

operators along the network battled around the clock; by Friday
night, the worm was under control and had nearly been eliminated,
barely two days after it had been unleashed.

It had no lasting

effects except to raise a flag of warning about what could have
happened had the worm not been benign.

If not for a flaw in the

code, the worm would replicated at a significantly slower rate
and probably could have gone unnoticed for months.

It's ironic

that the creator, Robert T. Morris Jr., made his mistake when
adding code to increase his worm's longevity in the network and
avoid defenses aimed at it. 7

What is even more ironic is that

Robert T. Morris Sr. was one of the programmers who came up with
the concept of Core Wars.

S

The programs written and used for core wars are a far cry
from the code that allowed the worm to infect and estimated 6000
computers world wide.

The worm was designed to exploit flaws in

a UNIX operating system, and then only in certain types of
machines.·

This in turn differs from the dozens of viruses that

have plagued personal computer users everywhere.

When the media

started to report stories of computer epidemics, everything was
glazed with the

generalized name virus.

Actually there are

several different classifications of replicant code.

As with

most topics in computer science, there aren't any sharp lines
drawn to distinguish types but several generally accepted
guidelines are used below.

One thing that can be generalized is

that they are all computer programs, usually written with
mischievous or malicious intent.

During some of the initial

media reports, people were fearful that they could catch and get
sick from computer viruses.

This is, of course, totally

ridiculous because the viruses are only programs and not
biological organisms.
A real virus, which is a living organism, attaches itself to
a cell and forces it to duplicate itself over and over again. A
computer virus is so named because it behaves in much the same
manner, embedding itself in another program or file. Once a virus
comes in contact with a system, it typically attacks by altering
the operating system, the master program that drives a computer.
The corrupted operating system places copies of the virus into
other programs that it comes into contact with.

If this other

software is run again, it will have the same ability to corrupt

the operating system and infect other software. When possible the
virus also corrupts the master copy of the operating systems so
that the computer system will be infected as soon as it is
started up.
One common strategy used to spread a virus is to hide the
code within another program.
method.
infected.

This is known as the Trojan Horse

Naturally, users won't operate on a

syste~

they know is

Therefore to get the bug into other systems, they

place the virus inside a very attractive package, say a word
processor or a game.

The new user doesn't think anything of

using the new program and soon the virus has spread throughout
his entire library of software.

Several hackers were especially

devious in their choice of a trojan horse program. A program
called flushot3 was designed to fight/detect viruses.

Rather

then being commercially available, it used the concept of
shareware distribution and was readily available on many bulletin
boards.

The problem was that vandals modified copies of flushot3

and inserted

viruses in them.'o

Then instead of protecting

their systems, people were actually infecting them.
A worm, like the one that attacked Internet, differs from a
virus because it is a self contained program.

This means that it

doesn't attach itself to other software. Once in a system, it
remains a separate entity and survives by living off of flaws in
the host system's logic.

In the Internet infection,

several

computer labs remained uneffected because they were using
modified versions of UNIX."

These nonstandard versions had

eliminated the well known weaknesses of UNIX, weaknesses that
have been recognized for years but often ignored.
A bacterium is a program that is identified more by its
results than its methods.

It keeps duplicating itself, usually

by exploiting a weakness in the host system.

Eventually the

system is slowed down to a snails pace just by the sheer
magnitude of jobs created by the bacterium.

It doesn't actually

alter or damage anything but the system is rendered ineffective
because most of the processor time is used to create and send out
clones of the program.
1987.

A case of this occurred around Christmas

Somehow a "Christmas Card"

got into the BITnet network.

Aside from the seasons greeting, it drew a
tree on the screen.

~icture

of a christmas

At the same time, it sent a copy of itself

to everyone on the current users mailing list.
very rapidly and bogged down the network.
shut down the network to
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It propagated

It was necessary to

clear the forest.

Both worms and viruses potentially pose different problems
than bacterium because they may include routines that perform
special functions, rather than just survival.

Their purpose may

be something as playful and harmless as to display a message
asking for cookies; its purpose may be something as potentially
harmful as wiping out a data base.

Often this hidden routine is

constructed so that it executes at a predetermined date, after a
given number or repetitions, or whenever some other specified
conditions are meet. This "time bomb" effect is what makes
infections particularly worrisome.
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In the main

compute~

lab

in Faner Hall, students are able to check out software from a
library which includes Lotus 1-2-3, Wordstar and many other
programs.

Many of the students affected were working on a Lotus

1-2-3 project.

It was estimated that two hundred students in

that class alone had their software exposed to the Pakistani
virus.

Evidently someone had a bootlegged version of Lotus or

some other program and used it or an infected data disk while
using software checked out from Faner Lab.
managed to infect the library's software.

In this way, someone
Then another student

checked it out and caught the virus; the cycle just went on and
on from there.
Bill Baron, lab director for Computing Affairs at SIU,

said

that he had heard talk of viral epidemics but had no reason to
expect one at SIU.

He also said its severity was partly

Computing Affairs fault.
the software library).

"Our disks weren't write protected
We were being overly benevolent.

(in

Many

people who come in and use programs like PC Write don't even have
a working disk.

So they put their working file on our the disk

so they can print their paper."

He added that not having the

write protect tabs ( which would prevent the virus from altering
the disk) also made it easier when lab workers went to
reconfigure the disks. The epidemic was severe enough that
computing affairs shut down the software library.
The library was shut down for three days, in which they
implemented a three part plan to clean up the Pakistani virus at
SIU.

They consider there to be three types of software:

computing affairs, faculty for instruction, and user(student).

It was

decid~d

to clean up computing affairs first,

provide the majority of software on campus.

since they

They had to

completely rebuild their libraries from the manufacturers
originals.

Normally copies are made from masters, copies of the

originals that are configured for SIU's particular terminals, but
even the masters had been corrupted.
The second phase was to verify the integrity of instructor
supplied software - special software that professor leave to be
checked out by students.

They notified all faculty that their

software was quarantined until they came and personally verified
that it was free of infection and signed a letter to that effect.
Phase three was to clear up, as much as possible, user
software - that is software that students carry around.

To

achieve this goal, a check station was set up in Faner lab.

At

the station, lab workers would check anyone's software for
viruses and if requested, to eliminate it.

Mr. Baron said they

assumed most computer science majors and other with computer
knowledge would have already taken care of their software; the
station, which was operated for two weeks, was
else.

The service

computing affairs.

for everyone

was provided free to students but not to
It cost about six-hundred additional dollars

in salaries to man the station.
Measures have been taken to insure that this won't happen
again.

All of computing affairs disk are specially write
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will probably rip, or at least be noticed.
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Nothing, aside from living in a glass house and writing all of
your own software can absolutely guarantee your computer's
security.

The problem with developing technical solutions

against viruses is that the people who create viruses are just as
ingenious as those who defend against them.

It can be seen as a

tit-for-tat war; someone writes a virus - someone else

develops

a defense; another figures out a way to breach that defense - yet
another finds a way to improve the defense.

The cycle doesn't

end.
If technical solutions are temporary fixes at best, what can
be done to stem the tide of virus attacks?
applicable

A idea that is more

at the industrial/commercial level is more emphasis

on physical security - that is restricting physical aCcess to the
computer systems and placing tighi checks and usage requirements.
There are also methods to prevent remote access from unauthorized
locations.

The government's data transmission network is the

ultimate example of this.
lines in gas filled tubes;

They employ private communication
17

no one could causally reach their

computers and if they tried to tap the lines, an alarm would be
sounded.

This level of prevention is too costly to be practical

in most other situations.

There are additional problems in

restricting access and causing legitimate users untold headaches
just trying to logon.

A final consideration is that the viruses

that have done the most real damage in terms of data lost have
been loosed by someone on the inside, usually by disgruntled
former employees.

All of the security is for naught if the

is/was a legitimate
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Most companies simply

by

cover it up deny that there was ever a problem.

Even when a

former employees are the perpetrators, they are sent off with a
pat on the back rather than a date in court.

One company even

gave a going away party to a former employee to smooth things
over-.
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Even Dr. Harold Highland, the editor-in-chief of Computers
and Security magazine

encouraged cover ups.

"My recommendation

to a corporate entity would be to deny it immediately.

I have

advised industry that if anything like this happens and you can
kill it by denying it, kill it. """"

This is reasonable from one

perspective - a lot of publicity only puts the spotlight on
vulnerable companies; There is also the fear of copycat crimes if
media exposure is too great.

It is open to debate though whether

the fear of punishment after several successful prosecutions
would offset the chance of copycats.

Other companies and the

public in general could benefit by being made aware of the
potential dangers that lie in wait for them.
Where the real and potentially life-threatening danger lies
is in viral attacks on networks.

Untold harm could be done if a

virus got into a hospital's records or managed to disrupt an air
traffic control network.

The risk grows greater and greater

every day, as computers become more interconnected and more
compatible and access easier to gain.

Robert Morris Jr.'s virus,

although its effects were felt worldwide, was only an
inconvenience.
anyone;

He was playing a game and didn't want to hurt

the stakes might be higher in the next game.

For the

most part, luck has kept the computer industry from a major

disaster.

The Internet attack served as a

experts in the field.

wake up call to

This time there was no

Will we be so lucky next time?

permanent damage.
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